Neighborhood Patrols and the Law: Citizens\u27 Response to Urban Crime by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 4 Article 7 
1973 
Neighborhood Patrols and the Law: Citizens' Response to Urban 
Crime 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neighborhood Patrols and the Law: Citizens' Response to Urban Crime, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 973 (1973). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
NEIGHBORHOOD PATROLS AND THE LAW:
CITIZENS' RESPONSE TO
URBAN CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of case law which has held that public authorities have a virtual
monopoly over the prevention of crime,' and at the same time has limited severely
the right of citizens to carry weapons for self-defense,2 to compel the authorities
to provide better municipal services,3 or to recover under tort principles for
lack of protection, 4 citizen fear of violent crime has prompted an enormous
growth in the number of private police and citizen self-help groups.5 There
1. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) ; Note, Private
Assumption of the Police Function under the Fourth Amendment, 51 B.U.L. Rev. 464, 471
(1971).
2. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 584-85, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293 N.YS.2d
897, 900-01 (1968) (dissenting opinion); see N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.00-.35, 400.00 (McKin-
ney 1967).
3. Although plaintiffs have prevailed on the ground of a denial of equal protection where
it was shown that the municipality discriminated between the plaintiffs and others on the
basis of race, as in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), and Hadnaott v.
City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), in the more usual case, where munici-
pal facilities in the poorer sections of town are in bad and even dangerous condition due to
repeated vandalism, citizens have no cause of action against the city for failure to keep the
facilities in good condition. In the recent case of Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.
1972), the court found no cause of action for denial of equal protection where wide disparities
existed between the condition of plaintiff's neighborhood park in a predominantly black and
Puerto Rican area and adjacent parks in predominantly white areas because the city had
made substantially the same commitment to all the parks in terms of funds and personnel.
The court noted that "[in a case like this, the City has satisfied its constitutional obligations
by equal input even though, because of conditions for which it is not responsible, it has not
achieved the equal results it desires." Id. at 290-91 (footnote omitted). Thus, short of un-
constitutional discrimination in the allocation of city resources, citizens cannot require a
city to improve municipal services. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973), which held that the Texas ad valorem property tax to finance public
education bore a rational relationship to legitimate state purposes and did not violate the
equal protection clause.
4. Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. App. Ct. 1971);
Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.YS.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1972). See
generally 2 C. Antiean, Municipal Corporation Law § 12.05 (1971).
S. During the 1960s, the number of contracts between property owners and private
companies providing security guards nearly doubled; annual revenues of such companies
grew 11-12 percent per year. 1 Rand Corp., Private Police in the United States: Findings
and Recommendations 13 (1972) (prepared for the Department of Justice). Because of the
ad hoc nature of civilian patrols, the growth in the number of such groups is more difficult
to measure. According to the New York City Police Department, the number of such groups
has more than doubled in the past three years. Interview with Capt. Arthur J. McNevin,
Commanding Officer, Community Affairs Division, N.Y.P.D., in New York City, Feb. 7, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Police Interview].
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are now more than 7,000 block associations in New York City alone, many of
which engage in some form of block security program.o
The courts of this state have consistently denied relief to citizens seeking
to impose a duty of protection against criminal acts on municipalities and
on urban landlords.8 Although such holdings have worked a tremendous in-
justice on certain individual plaintiffs, it is questionable whether, had these
cases been decided differently, the imposition of liability on either the munici-
pality or the landlord would have helped to create a safer city.9
The very purpose, however, of civilian patrols and private security guards
is to prevent crime rather than to secure indemnification after the fact. As
these groups grow in numbers, and neither the fear of crime nor the minimal
duty of protection owed the citizen changes, there is reason to believe neigh-
borhood patrol action in some form will become a lasting feature in New York
City. Citizen patrols have benefited from active police support for at least
two years,'0 and groups whose programs meet with police approval will soon
receive financial support from the City."
Although it is contended that the task of enforcing the laws must remain
exclusively in the hands of government, the assumption that the police force
should also pre-empt the field of crime prevention may no longer be true.12
The police themselves in New York City do not view this as desirable, both
because complete police domination of the job of preventing crime in a com-
plex society does not foster a good relationship between the public and the
police, and because police pre-emption does not prevent crime as well as a
coordinated effort between the police and the neighborhood. 18
6. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1973, at 41, col. 1.
7. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968), discussed at text accompanying notes 16-21 infra; Bass v. City of New York, 38
App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1972), discussed at text accompanying notes
24-28 infra. One of the few New York cases which allowed recovery to an injured plaintiff
was Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958),
where plaintiff acted as an informant in response to police solicitation and, as a result of
police negligence in protecting him, was murdered. The Court of Appeals held that since
plaintiff had responded to a specific police request, the police bad a duty to protect him. Id.
at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70.
8. See, e.g., Hall v. Fraknoi, 69 Misc. 2d 470, 473, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (Civ. Ct. 1972),
discussed at text accompanying notes 36-37 infra. See also Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 71
Misc. 2d 384, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (per curiam), discussed at text accompanying
note 39 infra.
9. But cf. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 587, 240 N.E.2d 860, 864, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
10. Police Interview.
11. The proposal would authorize an expenditure of $5 million for block security. Mayor
Lindsay outlined the program as one which "will focus for the first time on the crime prob-
lems and security needs of single blocks .... It will provide technical and financial support
for those local residents and community groups that are willing to make their blocks and
homes safe." N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1973, at 41, col. 1.
12. But cf. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 576-77, 198 N.W.2d 409, 411-12 (1972) (dis-
senting opinion).
13. B. Ward, The Search for Safety: A Dual Responsibility (1972) (unpublished Justice
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It will be assumed that there should be a legitimate role for the private
citizen in crime prevention. This comment will discuss the continued efforts
of individual citizens to impose liability on the city and landlord for failure
to provide protection against crime, and at the same time, the emergence of
neighborhood patrol groups in New York City, and whether or not this form
of citizen participation is a desirable one. It will also attempt to discern what
the proper function of neighborhood groups should be, and finally, whether
there should be any change in the legal status of such groups in light of sig-
nificant government support. The emergence of neighborhood patrol groups is
a nationwide phenomenon, and although the discussion of this phenomenon
will be limited to New York City and to New York law, the applicable law
varies little from state to state' 4 and the conclusions reached are not limited
to any one jurisdiction.
I. PRIVATE SUITs AGAINST THE CITY
If liability for failure to provide adequate protection is implicit in a duty
to protect against street crime, then no one is under a duty to protect the urban
citizen in this state.' 5 The New York courts have consistently interpreted the
municipal obligation to provide police protection to the public, which obligation
is often set forth in a city's charter, as a duty which runs to all and admits no
cause of action by an individual member of the community against the city for
failure to protect him.
In Riss v. City of New York,' 6 the court of appeals refused to hold the
city liable for its police department's failure to provide plaintiff with special
protection after a rejected suitor had repeatedly threatened her with physical
injury. Plaintiff's subsequent injuries were held not to be the city's respon-
sibility. Intimating that municipal liability would place an overwhelming finan-
cial burden on the community, the majority was unwilling to "foist a presumed
cure" for crime on the city by "judicial innovation of a new kind of liability
in tort," and argued that any expansion of the general rule must be made by
the legislature.j7
Department Report) [hereinafter cited as Ward]; Police Interview. See generally The Presi-
dent's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The
Police, ch. 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as President's Commission].
14. The limited powers of private citizens to effect an arrest and justifiably use force are
similar in all states. See, e.g., I. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 7-1 to 7-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972) ; N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A: 113-6, 2A: 161-1 (1972). See also Note, Private Police Forces: Legal
Powers and Limitations, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555 (1971). A refusal to impose liability on the
municipality is also the general rule, see text accompanying note 4 supra. However with
respect to landlord liability, several jurisdictions, unlike New York, have allowed recovery
by the tenant for the landlord's failure to take reasonable security measures. See, e.g., Kline
v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Harris v. Johnston, 387 Mich.
569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
15. New York is not unique in this respect; the policy of no liability is applied through-
out the country. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972) (dictum) ; Simpson's
Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. App. Ct. 1971).
16. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
17. Id. at 582, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899. See also Motyka v. City of Am-
1973]
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Although one commentator 18 has criticized Riss and like decisions for "luxu-
riating in nightmares"' 9 which the courts have no right to entertain once the
legislature has waived governmental immunity to suit,2" and despite the obvious
counter-argument that the imposition of a duty to protect the individual calls
for a standard of reasonableness rather than one of strict liability,21 the rule
of no liability persists.
Notwithstanding the illogic of the principle that a municipal duty to all
citizens runs to no one citizen in particular,22 the principle has been applied
both in New York and throughout the country, especially with respect to
police protection 2 3 So well entrenched is this policy that it prevailed in Bass v.
City of New York,24 where plaintiff sought damages for the death of his nine-
year-old daughter on the ground that the Housing Authority's police force,
by its wholly inadequate protection of plaintiff's high-rise project, had allowed
his child's rape and murder.25 Once the appellate division determined that the
sterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965); Murrain v. Wilson Line,
Inc., 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d
704 (1945); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
18. 2 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 12.05, at 122 (1971).
19. Id.
20. In 1929 the legislature waived the state's immunity to suit by § 8 (then § 12) of the
Court of Claims Act, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney 1963). In Bernardine v. City of New
York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945), this waiver was held to be applicable to the
state's subdivisions. But the courts have left the door open to the creation of a new immunity
through recognition that police protection is a distinctly governmental function for which a
unique defense is applicable. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586-88, 167 N.E.2d 63, 67, 200
N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (1960). Such a principle of law would be consistent with the general rule
that the duty to provide police protection runs to the general public and not to any indi-
vidual. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) ;
Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); H. R. Moch v. Renssalaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
21. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968): "[Tlhe underlying assump-
tion of the argument is fallacious because it assumes that a strict liability standard is to be
imposed and that the courts would prove completely unable to apply general principles of
tort liability in a reasonable fashion .... " Id. at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902
(Keating, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93
S. Ct. 913 (1973); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1971).
24. 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1972).
25. The appellate division did not reach the question of whether the defendant had
caused the child's death by its negligence. Both the majority and dissent were concerned
primarily with the issue of a Housing Authority duty of protection. The lower court decision,
which was reversed, found that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
child's death. "Defendant created and maintained a climate in which vice and crime flourished
... ." 61 Misc. 2d 465, 473, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1969), rev'd, 38 App. Div. 2d
407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1972). Moreover, the intervening criminal acts of the
assailant were not "unrelated to the total failure of ... police protection ... ." Id. at 474,
305 N.Y.S.2d at 810, rev'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1972).
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Housing Authority was authorized by statute 6 to operate a police force, and
was therefore performing a governmental rather than a proprietary function,
it was of no importance that defendant had failed in its duty to a particularly
outrageous degree.27
Although results such as that in Bass may appear particularly harsh, it is
difficult, putting aside any theory of risk-spreading,m to criticize them for their
effects on crime prevention. Such criticism would presuppose that the fear of
liability works as an effective deterrent to future negligence, and that the lack
of culpable negligence would reduce crime. But this argument assumes that
a city police department has sufficient control over criminal activity to lessen
positively its effects on the public by greater diligence.
This may be true in certain limited factual situations. For example, in Riss,
which involved a single, known individual2 against whom the city refused to
protect the plaintiff, a different result by the court might have led the police
to inquire more carefully into such threats to citizens in the future, and if
they were substantiated, to take reasonable precautions to protect such in-
dividuals 30
The rule of no liability does not completely foreclose recovery to injured
plaintiffs, because it does not apply to ministerial, as opposed to discretionary,
police functions. For example, municipalities have been held responsible for
careless gun play by a policeman on duty which caused injuries to a bystander.31
Victims of crime may also recover from the state for medical expenses and
loss of earnings under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, but recovery is
limited and explicitly awarded "as a matter of [legislative] grace" rather than
as a legal right.32
26. N.Y. Pub. Hous. Law § 402(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
27. Plaintiff's nine year old daughter was seized on her way back to school after lunch
by another resident of the project, and was taken to the roof of her building. There she was
raped, dangled over the side and finally thrown 14 stories to her death. One security guard
was assigned to the ten-building, 16-acre project, and he was on his lunch hour at the time
of the incident. The defendant took no issue with the project's astoundingly high crime rate
and "[did] not deny that it was the recipient of notice of these conditions in embarrassing
abundance." 61 Misc. 2d at 469, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 806, rev'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d
569 (2d Dep't 1972).
28. See Calabresi & Hlirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale LJ.
1055, 1078 (1972); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 463, 510 (1963).
29. 22 N.Y.2d at 587,240 N.E.2d at 864, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (dissenting opinion).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956)
(mem.); Goldman v. City of New York, 278 App. Div. 770, 103 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dep't
1951) (mem.).
32. N.Y. Exec. Law § 620 (McKinney 1972). Limitations on recovery indude provisions
disallowing recovery for minimal claims, injuries caused by intra-family crimes and crimes
which were not promptly reported to the police, and a maximum compensation limit of
$15,000 for lost earnings. Only expenses and losses not covered by insurance are compensable.
Other states have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 258A, §§ 1-7
(1968); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 13960-66 (West Supp. 1972).
1973]
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The police department is presumably able to train its officers not to endanger
the public through ministerial negligent acts, such as shooting after a fleeing
suspect in a crowded area. A rule which imposes liability for such ministerial
acts, like the exclusionary rule for illegal searches and seizuresm3 can be an
effective deterrent to controllable police misconduct. It should be noted, how-
ever, that such a rule would not always further criminal law enforcement, since
it recognizes that in some situations protecting the rights of citizens is more
important than catching the criminal.
The more typical situation, however, is presented in Bass, where the assailant
was a stranger to plaintiff's child, no threat of injury was ever received, and
no ministerial negligence was at issue. To make a municipality liable here
may produce a more just result, but only by way of compensating the victim,
because the deterrent value of such liability might be quite insignificant. The
municipality might in fact determine that it is more feasible to pay tort claims
than to staff a public housing project with enough policemen and equipment
to provide adequate protection to citizens who live in high crime areasP4 The
question of how best to protect the public, when ministerial police negligence
is not involved, is a more complex problem, which the courts apparently will
not seek to resolve by imposing municipal liability.
III. PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST THE LANDLORD
Just as the New York courts have refused to find a duty on the part of
municipalities to protect the individual citizen, they have been adamant in
denying recovery to tenants who seek to hold their landlords to a duty of rea-
sonable care in providing protection against criminal assault in the common
areas of their apartment buildings. 85
In the recent case of Hall v. Fraknoi,30 where plaintiff landlord sued for
non-payment of rent, the court refused to allow defendants' affirmative defense
and counterclaim for the landlord's repeated failure to "'take even minimal
steps' ,7 to make defendants' building secure from muggers. Although acknowl-
33. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. 22 N.Y.2d at 589, 240 N.E.2d at 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05.
35. Limited recourse for the New York City tenant is provided by article 7-A of the
N.Y. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law which permits tenants of a "multiple
dwelling" (see N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 4(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972)) to bring a special
proceeding "for a judgment directing the deposit of rents into court and their use for the
purpose of remedying conditions dangerous to life, health or safety . . . ." N.Y. Real Prop.
Actions and Proceedings Law § 769 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also Tynan v. Willowdale
Commercial Corp., 69 Misc. 2d 221, 329 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Civ. Ct. 1972), where the court
construed the statute finding that to the extent that a bell and buzzer communications system
acts as a deterrent to crime in an apartment building, the landlord is obligated to keep the
system in reasonable repair. However, the court explicitly disclaimed any intention on its
part to find "a landlord is accountable for the criminal and violent trespasses committed
against the person and property of his tenants." Id. at 223, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
36. 69 Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
37. Id. at 472, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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edging that cases in other jurisdictions, notably Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp.,38 had imposed such a duty on the landlord, the court
stated that this duty was a bald judicial device to achieve a desired end, the
greater safety of the tenant, which could not be said to derive from the landlord-
tenant relationship. In another New York decision, Smith v. ABC Realty Co.,39
without discussing the question of duty, the court simply held that defendant
landlord's negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff tenant's injury,
where defendant had failed to repair a broken window in plaintiffs apartment
through which an intruder entered before attacking her. For the present, with
respect to the landlord-tenant relationship, courts appear hesitant to enlarge
the scope of the landlord's duty to the tenant, whether based on contract or
tort, to include protection against the criminal acts of third parties.
This judicial reluctance may reflect more than fear of a "crushing burden"
on either municipalities or landlords, hesitancy to usurp the legislative func-
tion,40 or mere intransigency 41 The very complexity of the relationship between
crime prevention on the one hand, and law enforcement and liability to the
victims of crime on the other, may explain the unwillingness of the New York
courts and legislature to allow a member of the general public to recover from
the city or the landlord for their failure to protect him.
The most basic problem of urban crime is not that of negligent police be-
havior, the situation set forth in Riss, or even the negligence of city landlords
in failing to make repairs, but the alarming frequency of unforeseen criminal
attacks on city streets and apartment corridors where a policeman cannot al-
ways be present.
Indeed, the police themselves in New York City feel that they lack sufficient
control over street crime to single-handedly transform a dangerous area into
a safe one, even if they were provided with the funds to hire many more police-
men. In this respect, the police view private citizens actively interested in
making their own blocks or building complexes safer, not only as a tremendous
untapped source of labor for the police, but possibly as the sine qua non for a
significant decrease in the amount of street crime.4
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL GRoUPs
Law enforcement and crime prevention have not always been the exclusive
domain of the police. In the early part of this century, town sheriffs compelled
the aid of citizens in local emergencies under pain of criminal penalties for
38. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
39. 71 Misc. 2d 384, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (per curiam).
40. See text accompanying note 17 supra. See also Comment, The Landlord's Emerging
Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 275 (1971).
41. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 140, 204 N.E2d 635, 637, 256
N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
42. Police Interview. The emphasis on public cooperation may be contrasted with the
now repudiated notion, popular several years ago, that the problem of preventing crime
could be solved merely by increased funding. Id. See also I. Clark, Crime in America
151-63 (1970).
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refusal.4 3 However, with the professionalization of the police, citizen involve-
ment in fighting crime greatly diminished; in the view of the police and, in
fact, the citizenry police departments became largely apolitical bodies pre-
empting the field of crime prevention. 44 Consequently, it has been argued, the
mushrooming of private security police and citizen patrol groups, whose func-
tion is essentially protective, reflects a public concern that the police are not
providing adequate protection: to some degree, the emergence of these groups
is "an indictment of the police."
'45
To a limited extent, the New York State Legislature has encouraged citizen
involvement in crime prevention. The "Good Samaritan Law"'40 seeks to in-
sulate the volunteer from personal tort liability under certain circumstances,
and the Crime Victim's Compensation Act, albeit to a limited extent, 47 indemni-
fies one who seeks to prevent a crime, as well as the intended victim. 48 Further-
more, a recent amendment of the Penal Law extends the privilege of self-
defense to defense of a third person who is reasonably perceived by the volunteer
to be in danger.49 But the legislature and the courts have not imposed an
affirmative duty on the citizen to prevent or even to report crime, nor have
they significantly enlarged the citizen's traditionally limited power to use force
in self-defense, and to make "citizen arrests."5 °
Until very recently, the neighborhood or block group itself has been the
primary initiator of citizen patrols. This is not surprising, since the ordinary
citizen has the greatest interest in a safe neighborhood: "Every day in our
cities the police or the victims of crime must depend on the willingness of
strangers and onlookers to summon aid, render emergency services, and even
help subdue assailants."'"
For purposes of this comment "neighborhood patrol groups" and like terms
refer to the estimated 75 organized groups in New York City, consisting of
a total of approximately 3,500 persons, who patrol their neighborhoods on foot
43. See Monterey County v. Rader, 199 Cal. 221, 248 P. 912 (1926).
44. See Weistart, Foreword, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 445 (1971).
45. Marx & Archer, The Urban Vigilante, Psychology Today, Jan. 1973, at 45-46.
46. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(2) (McKinney 1972). For example, the law protects physi-
cians from ordinary negligence claims if they treated accident victims without the expecta-
tion of pay.
47. N.Y. Exec. Law § 620-35 (McKinney 1972). Although no ceiling is placed on the
recovery of medical expenses, as opposed to lost earnings, see note 32 supra, the largest
award to date has been $35,000 to the family of a French exchange student who was robbed
and killed in New York City two years ago. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1973, at 45, col. 1, 2.
48. N.Y. Exec. Law § 621(5) (McKinney 1972). See also Cal. Gov't Code §§ 13970-74
(West Supp. 1972), which provides for recovery for private citizens who come to the aid of
victims of crime, and thereby suffer financial or physical injury "as a direct consequence of
such meritorious action to the extent that they are not compensated . . . from any other
source." Id. § 13970.
49. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
50. Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function, supra note 1, at 471.
51. President's Commission 224.
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or in private cars, generally in groups of two, and who report suspicious activity
to the police, often with walkie-talkie equipment. Although there are groups in all
five boroughs in the city, the majority are located in the Bronx and Queens,
where many members are homeowners or long-standing residents of their
communities.52
To be distinguished from neighborhood patrol groups are the Auxiliary Police53
who, like the neighborhood groups, are volunteers, possess no greater powers
than the ordinary citizen and serve near their own homes, but who are uni-
formed, undergo a short police training course and are authorized to act as
policemen in emergencies. Also to be distinguished are participants in the
city's Blockwatch Program, which enlists the aid of the elderly and the house-
bound who, from inside their homes, can watch their streets and apartment
hallways for criminal activity.54
The police for their part have traditionally viewed neighborhood patrol groups
both as a threat to their authority and a possible danger to society.r5 Recently,
however, police opposition to many of these groups has cooled, although police
still discourage groups which carry weapons or otherwise attempt to enforce
the law themselves. 5 The police perceived the need for more active civilian
participation a number of years ago, but until the last year or two found
themselves in the peculiar position of seeking to become involved with citizen
groups well after they were formed. Police now view patrol groups as an es-
sential aid to crime prevention in many areas and, at the same time, as a
challenge to their leadership which they must meet or suffer "a complete loss
of citizen confidence in the police or the rise of vigilante-type organizations."57
Civilian groups actively guarding their neighborhoods presently enjoy not
only the support of the police but considerable political favor. Pending likely
approval by the legislature a new city program will offer financial support and
guidance to block associations which secure police approval of their plans to
make their neighborhoods safe. The program, which is scheduled to begin in
the spring of 1973, would provide city funds of up to $10,000, for blocks which
put up matching funds of $3,825, to finance security equipment such as lighting
and gates, improvements in common areas of multiple dwellings, such as hall-
ways, elevators and lobbies, and alarm systems for local merchants, as well as
uniforms for patrol members. 8 In addition, the program calls for one resident,
named by his association, to be "block security officer," who will receive training
52. Police Interview.
53. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9185 (McKinney 1961).
54. Police Interview; see Training Manual for Blockwatchers (N.Y.C. Police Dep't, Com-
munity Affairs Div. 1972), which advises program members who to call in emergency and
non-emergency situations and how to give descriptions of suspects and escaping vehicles.
The Blockwatch program assigns each participant a code number for reporting purposes,
on the theory that anonymity will increase citizen participation.
55. Marx & Archer, supra note 45, at 46.
56. Police Interview.
57. Ward, supra note 13, at 2.
58. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1973, at 41, col. 1.
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from the Police Department on security systems, and who will act as a liaison
between the block and the police on crime prevention programs.50 Although the
program is to be managed by the Police Department, city funds will be dis-
tributed by private institutions, such as banks, if approved by the City Board
of Estimate.60
V. THE PROPER FUNCTION OF CMLIAN PATROL GROUPS
It is generally agreed that civilian patrol groups ought not become vehicles for
"vigilante justice." 61 At the same time, the city government as well as citizens
themselves feel that the public ought to be more actively involved in crime
prevention. The choice of a proper function for these groups should, it seems, be
determined by the choice of goals which one wishes them to serve, balanced by
the need to preserve other values which such groups' actions may endanger. The
prevention of crime is, of course, a primary goal, but it necessarily must be
weighed against the protection of the rights of suspects, the safety of all citizens,
the reservation to the police of the primary responsibility for law enforcement,
and other values.
The city police consider the function of civilian patrol groups to be little more
than serving as additional "eyes and ears of the police"; 0 2 persons who because
of their peculiar knowledge of the block or neighborhood are able to report
crimes and suspicious events quickly and accurately to the police.03 However,
the fact that police-organized meetings with patrol groups invariably include
explanations of the citizen's arrest powers and the criteria for lawful use of
force suggests that some groups may view their function as a more active one. 0'
Although civilian patrol groups and private security guards are more likely to
understand and to make use of their rights and powers than are ordinary citi-
zens, they are currently in the same legal position with respect to those rights
and powers.65 The question thus becomes whether civilian groups which enjoy
extensive municipal encouragement should be granted greater powers. Under
present New York law any enlargement of rights would necessitate a change in
legal status.
The laws governing the use of force and the power to make an arrest are excel-
lent examples, since these rights vary with the status of the person seeking to
exercise them. The law recognizes three distinct classes of persons in this regard:
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Police Interview. The New York Police Department denies that the groups which
it has helped to organize or supervise are vigilantes, and maintains that few such groups
actually exercise their citizen arrest powers.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. E.g., N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 140.30 (McKinney 1971), which deals with citizen
arrest powers, does not distinguish between private guards and ordinary citizens. Both
groups are given greater arrest powers only when they are directed to assist a police officer.
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(33) (McKinney 1971).
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police officers, peace officers and all others. (All police officers are peace officers,
but the converse is not true; peace officers include various court officers, parole
officers, certain tax inspectors and other government employees charged with
enforcing particular sections of the criminal code).
One major difference between police and peace officers is that the latter may
make arrests only for those crimes and infractions which they are specifically
authorized to enforce. But within the scope of their authority, peace officers'
powers to arrest and use force are no different than those of police officers.
Either kind of officer may arrest on probable cause and may use the force
necessary to do so. 66
The arrest powers of a private citizen have traditionally been more re-
stricted.6 7 He may not arrest on probable cause, but only when a felony has
in fact been committed by the person arrested, and in the case of an offense,
only when it has been committed in his presence.68
These differences in powers reflect a legislative judgment that the use of
force should, whenever possible, be reserved to government. At least two
reasons seem implicit in that judgment: private citizens lack the training and
capability of peace officers and may, in addition, be less accountable for their
negligence and misconduct. However, these considerations may not apply as
strongly to the block association member patrolling his own neighborhood.
Although he probably lacks the requisite training, he is in a sense more
socially accountable than the police officer who lives in the suburbs and
commutes to his job in the city. In addition, his familiarity with his home
area may make him more effective on patrol than a police officer, especially
if the latter is cruising in an automobile.
Conceivably, a citizen on patrol might be a far more effective deterrent to
crime in his neighborhood if he, like a peace officer, could arrest on probable
cause. Indeed, the effectiveness of citizen groups derives largely from their con-
tinuous presence in the neighborhood, which facilitates the accurate deter-
mination of probable cause, and the possibility that they could stop a fleeing
suspect who might have escaped before the police arrived. It thus seems that
granting full arrest powers to citizen groups could aid in the deterrence of
crime and the apprehension of suspects.
But even assuming that ordinary citizens are prepared to assume such
duties, would the grant of greater powers endanger the other values of insuring
the safety of all citizens and preserving the role of the police as society's
law enforcers? This question becomes crucial when it is recognized that
greater arrest powers, to be effective, must be accompanied by the power to
use force in making arrests, and perhaps even by the authorization to carry
weapons. This seems undesirable, for the very reason such groups were formed
in the first place: the streets of the city are apt to be very dangerous, and
66. Compare N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 140.10, 140.15 (McKinney 1971), with id.
§§ 140.25, 140.7.
67. Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function, supra note 1, at 470.
68. N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 140.30 (McKinney 1971).
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the patrolling citizen will rarely be met by suspects who will quickly defer to
the citizen's newly-enlarged arrest powers and wait for the police to arrive.
It is, of course, possible to expand the powers of patrol members without
giving them full arrest powers-for example, by authorizing them to stop and
detain suspects for questioning. But such a measure would be subject to the
same objections. Although the idea may seem attractive for a reason independent
of crime prevention, since it would relieve patrol members of liability for
certain acts which would otherwise be tortious, such immunity from tradi-
tional tort sanctions might promote carelessness and vigilantism.
In short, the grant of greater arrest or even detention powers might lead
citizen patrols to endanger their own safety and the safety of others, or might
encourage such groups to travel in large numbers or carry weapons, thus in-
creasing the chances of vigilante-like activities.
With respect to private guards, there is even less reason to tamper with the
traditional difference between the powers of police and private citizens. A
recent study revealed that private guards tend to be less well trained and
educated than public police 69 and often do not understand their legal powers
and responsibilities.7 0 Thus, if private guards were given the powers of public
police, to allow a neighborhood to hire guards might not only encourage
abuses but it would, in effect, provide that neighborhood with superior
municipal protection. Although, as a matter of fact, the most crime ridden
areas may receive less police protection that safer ones,7' to further this
inequity by granting private guards full arrest powers may be unconstitutional.
But aside from this consideration, private guards, unlike civilian patrol groups,
are neither socially accountable to, nor as interested in the problems of, the
communities which they patrol.
As civilian patrol groups and private guards grow in number in New York
City, and the task of preventing crime becomes a shared responsibility between
the public and the police, courts and the legislature ought not to expand the
powers of private citizens and hired guards patrolling the streets. The necessary
restrictions imposed on the goal of preventing crime appear to preclude more
active roles for such groups. Furthermore, even assuming the utmost good
faith and conscientiousness on the part of such groups, in the interest of all,
private citizens should not function as policemen for the simple reason
that their contribution as civilians is more desirable. It is the particular and
limited advantage of civilian patrols, and to a lesser extent private guards, that
they are able to maintain a continuous vigil of their own neighborhoods and
can report suspicious activity to the police before a crime occurs.
69. 4 Rand Corp., The Law and Private Police 143-44 (1971) (prepared for the De-
partment of Justice).
70. Id. at 100-01.
71. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 2 (report on a study planned by Professor
Peter Salins, Urban Research Center, Hunter College). For example, the Morrisania section
of the Bronx has the highest per capita crime rate in the borough, but ranks seventh of
the fourteen Bronx planning districts in the allocation of city funds for police services. Id.
at 44, col. 7.
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VI. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZEN PATROL GROUPS
It is readily apparent that general tort liability would attach for private
patrol misconduct.7 2 In organizing such groups a primary legal question then
becomes, would their conduct also constitute state action? The discussion of
this question will be divided into two parts: the first concerns the various
indices of state action and their application to neighborhood patrols; the
second treats the consequences and desirability of finding state action with
respect to such groups.
A. Indices of State Action
A traditional hallmark of state action is the sanctioned exercise of powers
not ordinarily granted to a private citizen. For example, in Hill v. Toll,73 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that special
powers granted by statute to bail bondsmen, enabling them to arrest bail
violators, placed the imprimatur of state action upon their conduct. The
abuse of this expanded authority was analogized to a policeman's abuse of
his authority for which the state is liable. The court buttressed its argument
with the general proposition that the state has, in the past, discouraged self-
help, and the grant of special powers beyond those possessed by the general
public was, at the very least, an official encouragement to use such powers. 4
Similarly, in the earlier case of DeCarlo v. Joseph Horne & Co.,7 5 another
district court reasoned that because the state's Professional Thieves Act, as
interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts, had authorized private watchmen
and guards to exercise arrest powers "which did not ... exist at common law,'",
any action taken pursuant to the statute was action under color of state law.
But not every grant of "police" powers results in state action. For example,
many states have enacted "shoplifting statutes," 77 which create a defense
against false imprisonment and false arrest suits to retailers who detain sus-
pected thieves for a reasonable time in order to make an investigation. The
line between private and state action is not a clear one.78 No doubt the more
72. See The Law and Private Police, supra note 69, at 107-16.
73. 320 F. Supp. 185 (EJD. Pa. 1970).
74. Id. at 187.
75. 251 F. Supp. 935 (Wi). Pa. 1966).
76. Id. at 936.
77. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 218 (McKinney 1968), which gives the retail merchant
who reasonably detains a suspected shoplifter, either to investigate or to call the police, a
defense to a civi action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation,
assault, trespass, or invasion of civil rights. One indication that such detention would be
considered private action is provided by holding that the merchants and their private guards
need not warn a suspect of his rights, as a police officer must. See, e.g., People v. Frank, 52
Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-100
(1971).
78. What constitutes action "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State" is not delineated in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
and so "each case must depend on its background, facts and circumstances in applying the
Act." DeCarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935, 936 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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closely the rights of private citizens resemble those of the police, the more
likely courts will be to find state action. The rights granted by "shoplifting
statutes" are quite limited-in time, place and in the nature of the offenses
for which retailers may detain suspects.79 The rights granted to bail bondsmen
and private watchmen by the Pennsylvania statutes discussed above not only
authorized arrest, rather than detention, but respectively appear to have been
designed to protect the entire bail system and were not limited to a single
class of criminal offenses.80 In addition, private watchmen would be more
likely to arrest for crimes of violence than would retailers.
Another criterion of state action is a partnership between private individuals
and state officials. Several Supreme Court cases have found a cause of action
for deprivation of civil rights acting under authority of state law could be
maintained against a private individual who is "a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents." 8' Although the concept of a partnership
between state officials and private citizens in cases such as Williams v. United
States8 2 and United States v. Price88 arose in the context of an insidious co-
ordinated effort between policemen and a few private persons, it would seem
to extend to the situation of a municipality's close association and cooperation
with a neighborhood organization.84
79. The defense may be maintained only for detentions in the defendant's store or Its
immediate vicinity, and only for a reasonable time to investigate the ownership of the goods
involved. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 218 (McKinney 1968). In Wolin v. Abraham & Straus,
64 Misc. 2d 982, 316 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1970), the court interpreted § 218 to cover
"larceny by trick"-i.e., by the use of stolen credit cards, bad checks and the use of counter-
feit money-as well as the more traditional forms of shoplifting.
80. See Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 186 (ElD. Pa. 1970); DeCarlo v. Joseph Home &
Co., 251 F. Supp. 935, 936 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
81. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
82. 341 U.S. 97 (1951). In Williams, petitioner was a private detective who held a
special police officer's badge issued by the City of Miami, Florida and had qualified and
taken an oath as such an officer. The Court held that by brutally forcing a confession from
a suspect, petitioner had acted "'under color' of law within the meaning of § 20 [of the
Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)], or at least that the jury could properly so find."
Id. at 99. Citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Co., 331 U.S. 416 (1947), the Court held
that Miami had vested petitioner with a policeman's powers. The case was, however, made
easier for the Court by the facts that a Miami policeman had been "sent by his superior
to lend authority to the [interrogation]. And petitioner, who committed the assaults, went
about flashing his [own special] badge." 341 U.S. at 99.
83. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). There, the Court held the district court had erred In dismissing
an indictment against 15 private citizens, which alleged that they had acted "under color"
of state law in conspiring with the state police officials to release several prisoners from
jail and then intercept and kill them. The fact that defendants were not state officials was
not dispositive, it being enough that they were wilful participants with state agents. 383
U.S. at 794.
84. Price and Williams dealt both with the question of whether or not state action was
involved and with whether a constitutional right was violated. Although a finding of state
action in the work of civilian patrols may be justified, it does not necessarily follow that
the requisite constitutional violation will be present, for example, by the mere carelessness
of patrols which results in injury to plaintiffs.
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Ironically, by closely supervising the initial organization of patrol groups
in New York City to avoid the abuses of power, real or imagined, the Police
Department may be forming a loose type of partnership with civilian groups.
Because this cooperation between police and patrols is only now beginning,
it is impossible to predict how extensive any partnership will be, or whether a
court would be justified in finding state action in the activities of these groups.
But if, for example, the police were to follow up an initial organizational meet-
ing with a neighborhood patrol group with periodic meetings and visits to the
area for the purpose of supervising such groups, the case for state action
becomes stronger.
The question is where to place civilian patrols, as they currently function in
this spectrum of private action to state action. If a member of such a group
were granted the full arrest powers of a police or peace officer, no doubt the
exercise of such powers would constitute state action. If, on the other hand,
such groups were accorded no additional powers and received no government
funding or active police support beyond that typically given to all citizens to
encourage them to cooperate with the police, their activities would not be
state action. However, the proposed city program, which apparently will pro-
vide equipment to, and which will fund out-of-pocket expenses of, those neigh-
borhood groups whose patrol activities receive police approval85 (as well as
the current police drive to form such groups), has promoted the organization
of patrol groups which fall somewhere in between the two extremes discussed
above. Even though these groups possess no more power than the ordinary
citizen, their very banding together as groups and their enjoyment of official
support may lend their actions the color of state authority. Moreover, other
citizens may perceive them as arms of the police, as well as "eyes and ears,"
especially if they are given badges, cards or other special identification. On
the other hand, the police, as discussed above, do not envision patrols as
representatives of the police department in any respect. Identification cards
issued to citizen groups acting under police guidelines explicitly state that
the bearer is not a peace officer and is authorized only to cooperate with the
police.18 Since presumably everyone is "authorized to cooperate with the
police," the card serves as a disclaimer of any additional powers or any change
in legal status. Although the police may lecture groups on the lawful scope of
their arrest powers, clearly they do not encourage the use of these powers,
but would have organized groups increase the effectiveness of the police by
learning who to call and how to get help quickly for neighborhood emergencies.
There is however more to the job of neighborhod patrols than serving as
a communications link from the streets and apartment corridors to the precinct
house. The police themselves speak of the efficacy of patrols "making their
presence known" on the streets.87 They believe that several persons regularly
patrolling the block, operate as a positive deterrent to crime in the area, similar
to the effect of a city patrolman. The police are not encouraging patrol groups
85. Police Interview.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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to use the arrest powers granted them under the common law,88 but they are
at the same time, encouraging organized groups to regularly supplement their
protection of the public.89
In sum, although the powers of neighborhood patrols have not been en-
larged beyond those possessed by ordinary citizens, such groups perform
functions which are among those traditionally performed by the police, and
they have received and will continue to receive police support, guidance and
encouragement. Moreover, they will, under the current plan, receive substantial
city funding. Members of patrol groups carry police-issued identification which,
while of no legal effect in itself, may together with growing public recognition
of such groups as partners or even arms of the police, identify their actions
to other citizens as police action. These factors suggest that a finding of state
action would not be inappropriate.
B. The Consequences of Finding State Action
Ideally, whether or not such a finding should be made, should depend not
only on the application of reasonable indices of state action but also upon the
consideration of its consequences and desirability.
With respect to municipal liability for failure to adequately supervise patrol
groups, the recent Sixth Circuit case of Gerneth v. City of Detroito is il-
lustrative. The city had undertaken to investigate private guard applicants
before issuing them licenses. The ordinance provided that a license be denied
if the applicant be adjudged insane or a convicted felon. The plaintiffs sued
the city for damages from personal injuries sustained when they were shot by
a guard employed by a private agency as a watchman at the Greyhound Bus
Terminal. The guard had been convicted in 1963 of the felony "careless use of
firearms." Apparently, the city's investigation had not turned this up, and
plaintiffs maintained that, because the city had undertaken to investigate the
guard-the private agency might have done so itself, but instead relied on
the city to screen its employees-therefore the city was liable to the plaintiffs
for its negligence.
Obviously, the City of Detroit, by means of the ordinance had assumed a very
active role in regulating the private security industry. Not only were guards
required to be licensed, but the city also was taking preventive measures by
investigating guards before licenses were granted. But the court stated that if
Detroit were held liable in cases such as this, the finding would "substantially
interfere with the licensing and investigatory functions" 01 of the city. In so
88. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
89. It has been suggested that the routine participation of private police in certain areas
of law enforcement may in certain instances supplant the public police, and that to this
extent, private police perform a public function. Thus, where this routine participation is
coupled with the active cooperation of the public police and a mutual dependence of the
two groups, the activities of private police may become state action. Note, Private Police
Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555, $81 (1971).
90. 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 913 (1973).
91. Id. at 787.
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doing, the court seized upon the traditional argument that despite the waiver
of sovereign immunity, the municipality when performing a governmental
function whose benefits ran to all, would not be liable to the individual for
its negligent performance of that duty.92 The doctrine is well established, as
discussed earlier, and is seemingly permanently supported by arguments that
liability would impose a crushing burden on the state and open the floodgates
of litigation.9 3
Almost at the outset, then, it would seem, one can put aside all effects upon
the municipality's liability properly to supervise the actions of neighborhood
groups. Despite the fact that in Gerneth the City of Detroit was merely
regulating private action, and the New York City police are actually en-
couraging private action, under present New York law as set forth in a
virtual "unbroken chain of decisional law,"95 police supervision of patrol groups,
whether or not performed properly, would be deemed a governmental function.
Barring police conduct intended to deprive a citizen of his civil rights or to
inflict harm upon him, such supervision would not be actionable by the
injured individual.
However, a finding of state action would subject members of neighborhood
patrol groups to suit in the federal courts under title 42, section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act 6 for action which deprives others of rights secured by the
Constitution. Traditional tort remedies, except perhaps those for failure to pro-
vide protection, would also be available for patrol misconduct, but the existence
of a federal claim may be particularly desirable. For example, problems of vigi-
lante conduct-most likely to arise in areas which are racially mixed or of
changing racial composition, where patrol groups may seek to exclude a particular
racial group or may be overzealous in their protection of property-seem well
suited for resolution in federal courts, where plaintiffs may escape local prejudices
and find a friendlier forum for constitutional issues.
Whether or not patrols are held to fall within the bounds of state action, they
will be insulated from suits for failure to protect the neighborhood adequately;
if they are state action, they are immune under the general principles applicable
to the police, and if they are private action they would be liable only under a
theory that they assume a duty of protection on which plaintiffs relied, a result
which seems unlikely. Conceivably, however, a patrolling citizen may stand in a
92. Id.; see Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Va. 1972); note 15 supra and
accompanying text. See also Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. 1972), which
brings into question all vestiges of sovereign immunity but holds fast to the rule that there
is no liability for failure to provide police protection.
93. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582-83, 240 N.E2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 898-99 (1968); cf. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 620, 249 N.E.2d 419, 425, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 562-63 (1969) (dissenting opinion). See generally 2 C. Antieau, Municipal
Corporation Law § 12.05 (1971).
94. 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. CL 913 (1973).
95. Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 415, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 577 (2d
Dep't 1972).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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different position to a person in need of help than the ordinary citizen who is not
charged with the duty to render assistance.
Although it is contended that the powers of neighborhood patrols ought not
to be enlarged, there are currently sufficient facts to find that state action is
involved because of municipal organization and support of patrol groups. Fur-
thermore, a finding of state action would give injured plaintiffs a remedy in
federal courts which may be distinctly preferable to suit in state court under
tort law, with respect to the type of misconduct most likely to occur.0 7
VII. CONCLUSION
Neighborhood patrol groups fill a recognized need for greater security. These
groups as they now function are enthusiastically regarded both by the public
and the police as a sound and efficacious means of preventing crime. However,
given the present trends, and the possibility that neighborhood patrols may con-
tinue to operate with public and official acceptance, it may be reasonable to find
that state action is involved. However, no matter how effective neighborhood
action may become, it is argued that to protect the rights of suspects and the
safety of all, the powers of such groups to effect arrest and exercise force should
not be expanded beyond those traditionally recognized as civilian powers. The
mere possibility of untrained citizens acting as policemen and dispensing rough
justice in their neighborhoods is very undesirable; it must remain a characteristic
of our society that the law is enforced by the more impersonal and presumably
more reasoned arm of the state than that of the local citizenry. What is needed
and what should be encouraged are local groups which fill the limited but impor-
tant role of deterring crime by their presence on the streets and by reporting
criminal and suspicious activity to the police.
97. See generally Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims,
6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1970).
